Establishing the Right to Inherit from an Intestate Decedent in Maryland - Alexander Chanthunya, LL.M (AU)

Every year in Maryland, individuals die without a valid will leaving behind property, financial accounts, and unresolved intentions. When that happens, the state does not simply confiscate the estate. Instead, a body of law steps in to answer the question the decedent never answered: who gets what? This is the law of intestate succession, codified in Title 3 of the Maryland Estates and Trusts Article, Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 3-101 to 3-413. What sounds like a routine legal formula, however, regularly produces deeply contested disputes particularly when the people who cared most for a decedent are not the people the statute names as heirs.

Understanding how to establish inheritance rights in a Maryland intestate estate is not a theoretical exercise. It is a practical, high-stakes endeavor that can determine whether a surviving family member receives a lifetime of shared assets or walks away with nothing. The stakes are equally significant for personal representatives, orphans' courts, and courts of equity charged with applying rules that were never designed to account for every human relationship.

The Statutory Framework: Maryland's Hierarchy of Heirs

Under Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 3-101, the net intestate estate is distributed to the decedent's heirs in the statutory order prescribed by the Estates and Trusts Article. The purpose of that order, as the Supreme Court of Maryland stated in Barron v. Janney, 225 Md. 228, 234–35, 170 A.2d 176, 180 (1961), is "to make such a will for an intestate as he would have been most likely to make for himself." The hierarchy proceeds as follows:

• Surviving spouse or registered domestic partner governed by Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 3-102 and 3-203; receives the entire estate if no surviving children exist, or shares with children in proportions set by statute.

• Children (issue) take the entire estate if no spouse survives; distribution governed by § 3-103.

• Parents — inherit if no spouse or issue survives; § 3-104(a).

• Siblings — take if no spouse, issue, or parents survive; § 3-104(b)(1).

• Grandparents and their descendants — inherit if all closer relatives are absent; § 3-104(b)(2).

• Stepchildren — may inherit only if the decedent has no surviving blood relatives at any level above, and the stepchild's parent was not divorced from the decedent; § 3-104(c).

One additional definitional rule carries enormous consequences. The term "child" under Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 1-205(b) expressly excludes stepchildren: "A child does not include a stepchild." That single exclusion means a stepchild cannot inherit as a "child" even when the relationship was indistinguishable from that of a biological or formally adopted child. When a decedent dies with any surviving blood relatives, § 3-104(c) provides no opening whatsoever for a stepchild claim through the statutory succession scheme alone.

The Doctrine of Equitable Adoption: When the Statute Falls Short

Maryland is among the majority of American jurisdictions recognizing the equitable adoption doctrine. As the Supreme Court of Maryland explained in In re Estate of Schappell, No. 15, Sept. Term 2024 (filed Feb. 11, 2025), the doctrine, sometimes called adoption by estoppel, virtual adoption, or de facto adoption—addresses a recurring injustice: an individual raised as a child, who fulfilled every duty of a son or daughter, yet was never formally adopted due to the decedent's inadvertence or failure to complete statutory proceedings. See Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty. v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 287, 635 A.2d 373, 376 (1994).

The foundational premise is grounded in both contract theory and equitable principles. If a person legally competent to adopt a child enters into a contract to do so, supported by consideration in the form of part performance, a court applying equitable principles may treat the child as formally adopted for certain limited purposes. McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 234, 533 A.2d 690, 690–91 (1987). The doctrine's precise contours, however, remained unsettled in Maryland for more than a century.

Historical Development in Maryland Courts

The earliest foundations of equitable adoption in Maryland appear in Clayton v. Supreme Conclave, Improved Order of Heptasophs, 130 Md. 31, 32–33, 35, 37, 99 A. 949, 950–52 (1917). There, a decedent named as beneficiaries two children, his niece and nephew, whom he had raised after their parents died. When the fraternal organization refused payment on the ground that the children were not legally adopted, the Court of Appeals held the organization estopped from denying the children's status, relying on both principles of contract and equitable estoppel. Id. at 34–37, 99 A. at 950–52. No adoption statute then governed the situation, and the Court observed that the organization had accepted the decedent's payments for over two decades without objection, conduct that itself gave rise to estoppel. Id. at 33–34, 99 A. at 950–51.

Three decades later, in Besche v. Murphy, 190 Md. 539, 541, 552, 59 A.2d 499, 500, 505 (1948), the Court of Appeals addressed whether a claimant raised by a decedent could inherit under a residuary clause providing that the estate pass as in intestacy. The Court declined to apply equitable adoption because the decedent had not died intestate, reasoning that the statutory intestacy rules, which the will expressly incorporated, did not recognize equitably adopted children. Id. at 541, 550, 552, 59 A.2d at 500, 504–05. Besche nonetheless confirmed that courts from other jurisdictions had consistently enforced unconsummated agreements to adopt, and it strongly suggested that Maryland would extend the same protection where intestacy was actually at issue. Id. at 547–48, 59 A.2d at 503–04.

That suggestion was held in McGarvey v. State, 311 Md. 233, 533 A.2d 690 (1987). Raymond McGarvey had been placed at age two with his aunt, who agreed with his parents to adopt him, raised him as her own son, but never completed the formal process. She named him the sole legatee under her will. A substantial inheritance tax was assessed at the 10% rate imposed on collateral descendants rather than the 1% rate applicable to direct lineal descendants. Id. at 235, 533 A.2d at 691. The Court formally recognized equitable adoption in Maryland, concluding that "the fairness of applying the doctrine of equitable adoption in the intestacy context . . . is apparent." Id. at 238, 533 A.2d at 692–93. It held, however, that equitable adoption did not reduce the applicable inheritance tax rate, because the statutory definition of "children" for tax purposes encompassed only formally adopted children. Id. at 241–43, 533 A.2d at 694–95.

McGarvey established the doctrine; Board of Education of Montgomery County v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 635 A.2d 373 (1994), defined its outer boundary. Paula Browning sought to inherit from Eleanor Hamilton, the sister of Marian Hutchison, a woman who had raised Browning but never formally adopted her. The Court confirmed that "Maryland recognizes the doctrine as it applies to an equitably adopted child who seeks to inherit by intestate succession from the estate of an equitably adoptive parent." Id. at 289, 635 A.2d at 378 (citing McGarvey, 311 Md. at 238–39, 533 A.2d at 692–93). At the same time, the Court refused to extend the doctrine to allow an equitably adopted child to inherit through an adoptive parent from that parent's collateral relatives. Id. at 293, 635 A.2d at 379–80. The equities that justify inheritance from the adoptive parent simply do not exist when the claimant seeks to inherit from the adoptive parent's sibling. Id.

The Modern Standard: In re Estate of Schappell (2025)

No Maryland decision has more comprehensively addressed the doctrine's requirements than In re Estate of Michael Gerard Schappell, No. 15, September Term, 2024, decided by the Supreme Court of Maryland on February 11, 2025.

The Facts

Michael Schappell died intestate on May 29, 2021, leaving no surviving spouse, domestic partner, biological children, siblings, parents, or grandparents. He left an estate claimed by distant relatives—aunts, uncles, and cousins—on one side, and by Karen Ellis, his stepdaughter, on the other. Ellis had been four years old when Schappell married her mother in 1979. She lived primarily with her biological father until age fourteen, then split time between households until reaching the age of majority.

Ellis alleged a decades long father-daughter relationship. Schappell reportedly attended her graduations, referred to her as "his daughter" when making introductions, listed her in his own father's obituary as a surviving granddaughter, and told her on multiple occasions that "when we're gone, all of this will be yours." He also requested her Social Security number to name her as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. After Schappell's hospitalization in 2020, Ellis and her husband traveled from North Carolina to care for his home. She made all funeral arrangements and paid for the funeral.

Petitioners, distant relatives, moved for summary judgment in the Orphans' Court for Montgomery County. The orphans' court denied the motion, transmitted seven issues of fact and law to the Circuit Court under Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 2-105(b), and the case proceeded through appeal.

The Appellate Court's Test and Why the Supreme Court Rejected It

The Appellate Court of Maryland adopted an intent-based test requiring proof that the decedent "objectively and subjectively intended to and did live as child and parent" with the claimant. In re Est. of Schappell, 260 Md. App. 532, 559, 310 A.3d 1181, 1196–97 (App. Ct. Md. 2024). It held that the requisite intent need not be a statutory intent to adopt, but rather an intent to "regard and treat" the claimant as a natural or legally adopted child, evaluated through the totality of the circumstances. Id. The Supreme Court reversed.

While the Appellate Court's approach offered flexibility, the Supreme Court found it too expansive. Permitting recovery on proof of a warm parent-child relationship—without requiring evidence of a specific intent to adopt would open the door to claims by any stepchild or foster child whose decedent "treats a foster child or stepchild lovingly and the same as any natural or legally adopted children." Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d 747, 753–54 (Cal. 2004) (cited approvingly in Schappell). That result, the Court warned, would improperly broaden the doctrine beyond its purpose.

The Two-Step Test Maryland Now Applies

The Supreme Court adopted an intent-based standard drawn substantially from Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d 747, 754 (Cal. 2004), modified with a mandatory two-step structure. In re Est. of Schappell, No. 15, Sept. Term 2024, slip op. at 41–45. Under the standard now governing Maryland intestate claims:

Step One — Proof of Intent to Adopt. The claimant must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of a direct expression on the decedent's part of an intent to adopt. This may be established through:

*An unperformed express agreement or promise to adopt;

*An invalid or unconsummated attempt to adopt;

*A statement by the decedent of intent to adopt the claimant; or

*Other acts or statements showing the decedent intended the claimant to be treated as a legally adopted child.

The Court declined to treat public representations alone as sufficient to establish intent. A decedent may hold out a stepchild as "like a son" or "like a daughter" without harboring any intention to vest that person with inheritance rights. Schappell, slip op. at 46–47.

Step Two — Acts Consistent with the Intent. The claimant must further demonstrate that the decedent acted in accord with that intent by:

·                     Manifesting to the public or community at large that the claimant was the decedent's natural or legally adopted child; and

·                     Treating the claimant as a natural or legally adopted child.

Both elements of the second step must be satisfied. Representation to the claimant alone is insufficient for the second step, as the Court noted that would largely duplicate the first step's inquiry into the decedent's direct expression of intent. Schappell, slip op. at 42 n.11.

Throughout both steps, the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. As the Court stated, quoting Ford, 82 P.3d at 754–55: "a claim for equitable adoption is based on a relationship with a person who can no longer testify as to intent, and because the claim rests on the principle of inherent justice, the need for justice should appear clearly and unequivocally from the facts."

Jurisdictional Context: Where Maryland Fits

Maryland's two-step test places it within the intent-to-adopt camp of American equitable adoption law, alongside California (Estate of Ford, 82 P.3d 747 (Cal. 2004)), Illinois (DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85 (Ill. 2013)), and the District of Columbia (In re Est. of North Ford, 200 A.3d 1207 (D.C. 2019)). Three broad approaches exist across the country:

Approach	Core Requirement	Representative Jurisdictions
Contract / Specific Performance	Express or implied agreement to adopt	Alaska (Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977)); Colorado (Barlow v. Barlow, 463 P.2d 305 (Colo. 1969))
Equitable Estoppel	Detrimental reliance on adoptive relationship	Iowa (In re Painter's Est., 67 N.W.2d 617 (Iowa 1954)); Texas (Jones v. Guy, 143 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. 1940))
Intent to Adopt	Direct expression of intent + consistent conduct	Maryland, California, Illinois, D.C.

Maryland explicitly declined to follow West Virginia's sweeping approach in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978), under which an equitably adopted child achieves full adoptive status for all purposes not just intestate succession. The Maryland Supreme Court reaffirmed in McGarvey, 311 Md. at 240, 533 A.2d at 694: "We are surely not prepared to go as far as West Virginia has gone." Schappell confirms that position: the doctrine in Maryland "applies only to inheritance from an intestate decedent" and confers no additional legal status.

Practical Implications for Claimants and Practitioners

Several realities define the litigation landscape in Maryland equitable adoption cases.

The orphans' court is the initial forum. Proceedings begin in the Orphans' Court for the relevant county. A claimant seeking recognition as an equitably adopted heir must file a petition establishing the factual basis for the claim. Under Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 2-105(b)(1)–(2), any interested party may request that contested issues of fact be transmitted to the Circuit Court for determination including, potentially, by jury. See also Md. Rule 6-434 (Transmitting Issues).

The clear and convincing evidence standard demands documentary proof. Informal arrangements, affectionate nicknames, attendance at family milestones, and generous oral promises, the common texture of close stepfamily relationships may be insufficient standing alone. Practitioners advising claimants should gather contemporaneous evidence: letters written by the decedent, obituaries authored by the decedent, insurance beneficiary designations, vehicle bill of sale or transfer documents, bank correspondence, and community testimony confirming the decedent introduced the claimant as a child. These are precisely the categories of evidence the Ellis record presented in Schappell.

The doctrine's limitations remain firm. Under Browning, 333 Md. at 293, 635 A.2d at 379–80, an equitably adopted child cannot inherit through the adoptive parent from collateral relatives of that parent. Under McGarvey, 311 Md. at 241–43, 533 A.2d at 694–95, equitable adoption does not secure the inheritance tax rate applicable to direct lineal descendants. The Schappell holding is also expressly limited to decedents who die with no surviving spouse, domestic partner, issue, parents, siblings, or grandparents. The Court explicitly reserved the question of whether the same test applies where an intestate decedent dies with closer surviving relatives. Schappell, slip op. at 6.

Both biological and stepfamily claimants may qualify. The doctrine is not restricted to stepchildren. It applies wherever a decedent formed a clear adoptive intent and acted upon it whether the claimant entered the relationship as a foster child, an informally transferred relative, or, as in Geramifar v. Geramifar, 113 Md. App. 495, 500–01, 688 A.2d 475, 477–79 (1997), a child whose equitable adoptive parents later separated before completing formal proceedings in the United States.

The Importance of Advance Planning

The complexity of intestate inheritance claims in Maryland carries a straightforward lesson. The doctrine of equitable adoption exists to remedy the gap between a decedent's evident intent and the state's default rules but it does so imperfectly, expensively, and under a demanding standard of proof. A well-executed will or trust eliminates the gap entirely, placing the decedent's own words in the record rather than forcing survivors to reconstruct intent from photographs, obituaries, and recollected conversations.

Maryland's intestacy statute operates, as the Court stated in Barron v. Janney, 225 Md. 228, 234–35, 170 A.2d 176, 180 (1961), as a will the state writes for those who never wrote their own. That will is necessarily generic. The doctrine of equitable adoption catches some of the resulting injustices but only those presenting clear and convincing evidence of a specific intent to adopt, acted upon by the decedent in ways visible to the community. Those who wish to leave their estates to specific individuals, regardless of blood or formal legal relationship, have a far more reliable tool: a will that says so plainly. Formal adoption, of course, remains the only route to full legal parity under Maryland law. See Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 5-331 to 5-342.

Conclusion

Establishing the right to inherit from an intestate decedent in Maryland is, for most statutory heirs, a matter of placing oneself within the hierarchy prescribed by Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts §§ 3-101 through 3-104. For those outside that hierarchy—stepchildren, foster children, others who occupied a parental relationship without formal adoption—the path is narrower but not closed. The Supreme Court of Maryland's decision in In re Estate of Schappell, No. 15, Sept. Term 2024 (filed Feb. 11, 2025), finally provided a definitive, coherent standard: clear and convincing proof of the decedent's specific intent to adopt, followed by proof that the decedent acted consistently with that intent in the eyes of the community. That standard honors the doctrine's equitable foundation—giving effect to what a decedent most probably would have done had life not intervened—while guarding against claims grounded in affection alone. For practitioners, claimants, and families navigating these proceedings, the doctrine's interplay with Maryland's statutory framework represents one of the more consequential frontiers of state probate law.

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